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5 The Speaker and the Budget
Daniel

J. Palazzolo

he Speakers of the House, from Carl Albert to Tom Foley, have faced
various challenges in the budgetary process since the passage of the Budget Act in 1974. That act required the Congress to fix budget targets in authorizations and outlays in each of thirteen functional categories for each fiscal year
and to reconcile annual authorizations and appropriations to those targets. It
created separate budget committees in each chamber and altered the legislative
process in an attempt to enforce budget discipline. Some challenges have been
defined by the individual Speakers themselves; others have emerged from institutional changes in the budget process, large deficits, and the political context within which budget decisions have been made. Speaker Albert's primary
challenge was to meet the formal guidelines of the new budget process. Under
Speaker Tip O'Neill, the task of facilitating the formal procedures of the Budget Act gave way to managing various forms of conflict over budget priorities,
representing the House majority party in negotiations with Senate leaders and
the president, and acting as a spokesperson for the Democratic party. Speaker
Jim Wright used the budget resolution to define the priorities of the Democratic party. Speaker Foley's major challenge has been to facilitate passage of
two major deficit reduction bills, first under a divided government in which
opposing parties controlled the Congress and the White House and then under the leadership of President Bill Clinton.
As we have seen in previous chapters, the Speaker of the House is a leader
who represents three different interests-institutional, party, and personal. As
an institutional leader the Speaker is expected to carry out the duties of presiding officer and facilitate the legislative process in a fair, efficient, and impartial
fashion. As the party's primary leader, the Speaker tries to mediate intra-party
conflict over policy preferences, build coalitions in support of the majority
party's position, and assist the president in passing legislation if the president
is of the same party as the Speaker. If the president is of the opposite party, the
Speaker acts as a national spokesperson and representative of the House ma-
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jority party's interests. Finally, all Speakers have personal interests in representing their electoral constituencies and their own policy preferences. This
chapter evaluates the strategies Speakers have adopted to deal with the major
challenges in the budget process and discusses how those challenges have affected the Speaker's three major interests.

Looking to the Past:
The Budget Process under Four Speakers
The challenges to leadership in the budget process have made it difficult for
each Speaker to balance institutional, partisan, and personal interests. When
the interests are incompatible, a Speaker's strategies for dealing with the challenges reveals which of the three interests the Speaker considers most important. The Speaker's strategies, in turn, affect how the budget process operates.
Each Speaker's capacity to deal with a challenge depends on how compatible
the Speaker's interests are with the challenges. Speaker Albert was ideally
suited for facilitating the budget process in its early years, but he was not inclined to use the budget resolution to formulate the majority party's priorities.
After 1981, Speaker O'Neill succeeded in blocking attempts by President Ronald Reagan and congressional Republicans to cut domestic spending-but at a
cost to the formal procedures of the budget process. Speaker Wright was very
effective in using the budget resolution to advance his priorities, but he was
accused of acting unfairly to the minority party. Speaker Foley's attempt to
reach a bipartisan solution to the deficit problem in 1990 reflected his belief
that it was the only way to pass a deficit reduction bill with a Republican in the
White House, yet some House Democrats thought he had abandoned the party's principles in the process.
Carl Albert: The Budget Act and the In$titutional Speaker
Speaker Albert presided over the first two years of the new budget process,

1975-1976. 1 Albert's central challenge was to help guide the budget process
through its formative stages, and his strategies reflected his institutional interest in making the budget process work according to the formal guidelines of
the Budget Act. The strategy involved explaining the complex procedures of
the Budget Act to participants in the new budget process, organizing the committees for action, and moderating fears about the uncertain potential of the
Budget Act. Although his successors would take on more political challenges,
Albert played a key role in implementing formal budget procedures at a time
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when the success of the new process was by no means certain.
Albert's final two years in office followed a period of major institutional
reform that simultaneously attempted to broaden the participation of the
members and integrate the decentralized and fragmented committee system in
the House. One objective of the Budget Act was to coordinate the various
authorization, appropriations, and revenue decisions made by the Congress.
Yet participatory reforms complicated efforts to coordinate legislative activity
by opening up the legislative process and allowing more members to participate in key decisions at the subcommittee level and on the floor. 2 The House
needed a patient and skillful Speaker to move the House from a long period of
committee government to a wide open, but-it was hoped-a more efficient,
legislative body.
In transition periods, leaders often struggle to accommodate conflicting
expectations about the course and relative speed of change.3 As Speaker Albert
entered his final two years in office, newer members wanted the reforms implemented quickly, while senior members preferred gradual change.4 Even
though Albert tried to accommodate both views, he was not supported wholly
by all factions of the Democratic party. Seventy-five first-term Democrats
elected in 1974 created most of the Speaker's problems. These members were
intensely independent and eager to participate in the legislative process. The
first-term members did not hesitate to complain to Speaker Albert about his
failure to initiate creative policy proposals and control committee chairs.5
In the context of these major political and institutional changes, Speaker
Albert took on the challenge of executing the Budget Act when Congress put
the process through its first trial run in 1975. Albert's action reflected both his
personal commitment to the new budget process and his institutional responsibility to assist th~ House with the formal procedures established by the Budget Act. Fortunately for the new budget process, Albert identified his role and
ably performed the functions associated with guiding the process through its
formative stages.
One of Albert's most important tasks was explaining to House members the
new budget procedures and purpose of the Budget Act. In early March, after
the House was organized to begin the 94th Congress, Albert and Brock Adams
(D-Wash.), Chair of the House Budget Committee, met with all the standing
committee chairs and Appropriations subcommittee chairs. Richard Bolling
(D-Mo.), former representative and a major player in the enactment of budget
reform, described the meeting:
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... Albert did an incredible job of organizing the leadership of the committees for the
transition into the new budget process. In 1975, after we organized the committees, he
had a meeting of all the committee chairmen with regard to the Budget Act and it was a
phenomenal experience. These guys had all voted for it, it had been going on for about
six months, and they didn't know the first thing about the Budget Act. One of them
knew a little. So, quite obviously, if it wasn't for the Speaker there wasn't going to be
any Budget Act. It wasn't going to last. 6
Adams credited Speaker Albert for expanding the purpose and limitations of
the new process:
The Speaker was incredibly important in communicating the idea that the [Budget]
Committee was not designed to compete with the other committees in the House. He
wanted to make clear and carry out the view that the first resolution was a planning
tool, a response, an alternative to the president's budget.7
Albert did not intend to use the budget resolution to challenge the Republican president's budget or to initiate particular budget priorities. The Speaker's primary concern was to pass a budget resolution on schedule, an objective
he emphasized on the House floor during the first debate on a budget resolution:
Mr. Chairman, I do not take this time to comment on the amendments either pending
or prospective.... I am not attempting to make a brief for any particular provision or
position. Nevertheless, I must assert, as the elected leader of the House, on behalf of this
House and the future of the Nation, that it is essential that we pass a budget resolution,
and that we finish our procedures within the time contemplated in the act itself. For
only by supporting a budget resolution can we continue the development of the vitally
important overall budgetary process in this Congress.8
The House passed the budget resolution by a vote of 200 to 196.
Thus, Albert rose to the first major challenge of the Speaker in the budget
process: making a credible effort to pass a budget. In Albert's view, "If we
didn't make it [the budget process J work we were going to be the laughing
stock." 9 As the House accepted the responsibility of enacting its own budget,
Albert was committed to getting the process started. Albert preferred Sam Rayburn's style of meeting in small groups or individually with committee chairs.
His extensive and cordial relationships with most members enabled him to
implement that style effectively. 10 Adams credited Albert for guiding the process in its earliest stages: "The Speaker, at that time, was a primary moving
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force in the budget process, a great factor in making the budget process
successful." 11

Tip O'Neill: The Emergence of Partisan
and Personal Interests
Speaker O'Neill witnessed more changes and encountered more challenges
in the budget process than any of the Speakers since the passage of the Budget
Act. During the Carter years, House Democrats were intensely divided over
budget priorities, and Speaker O'Neill worked to build support for the Budget
Committee's resolutions. In 1981, the problem of unifying House Democrats
peaked as President Reagan skillfully built a coalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats and wrested control of the budget process from the majority party in the House. After 1982, party unity on roll call votes increased
substantially, making it easier for the Speaker to solidify coalitions in support
of the Budget Committee's resolution. Yet large deficits, divided government,
and intense partisanship created havoc in the budget process. The formal procedures of the Budget Act were substituted regularly by informal, ad hoc arrangements for addressing the deficit. Ultimately, Congress passed a wholesale
revision of the Budget Act with the Balanced Budget and Deficit Control Act of
1985 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings). That law sought to put teeth into the budget process by requiring that if the budget outlay levels were exceeded in broad
functional categories of national defense and discretionary domestic spending,
the spending spigot would be closed by automatically sequestering funds
across the board. This led to intense conflicts over budget priorities. Speaker
O'Neill's challenges shifted from facilitating an orderly process to representing
and protecting Democratic budget priorities. As the period progressed, the
Speaker's partisan and personal policy preferences superseded his institutional
interests.
In the late 1970s, O'Neill's institutional and partisan interests were generally compatible. The Speaker continued to stress the importance of passing
resolutions on schedule, and since the Democrats had a majority in both
chambers and control of the presidency, it was in the party's interests for the
institution to perform as expected. But the party was divided along ideological
lines. Speaker O'Neill was often quoted as saying that the Democratic party
was really "five parties in one .... We've got about 25 really strong liberals, 110
progressive liberals, maybe 60 moderates, about 45 people just to the right of
the moderates, and about 35 conservatives." 12
O'Neill used two mechanisms for dealing with weak party cohesion-the
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Speaker's task forces and an expanded whip system. 13 Both devices involved
more members in the legislative process, improved communication between
the members and the leadership, and facilitated coalitiop. building. And both
techniques corresponded with O'Neill's conception of leadership: to provide
avenues for broad participation and to recognize the diverse ideological perspectives in the Democratic party. O'Neill used a classic "middleman" leadership strategy to build coalitions among the members of the party. He listened
to members and mediated differences between the factions of the party. At the
same time, O'Neill maintained an intense commitment to traditional New
Deal and Great Society programs. Thus, his two major challenges during the
Carter years were to reconcile ideological differences between House Democrats and to balance his personal commitment to preserve traditional Democratic programs with his responsibility to build winning coalitions for the Budget Committee's resolutions.
O'Neill struggled to keep the party together on numerous occasions. In
1977, the first year of O'Neill's speakership, the House initially failed to pass
the fiscal 1978 first budget resolution. The biggest problem was a mismatch
between the priorities of the liberal Democrats on the House Budget Committee and the House Democratic party as a whole. Conservative Democrats disagreed with the Budget Committee's decision to cut President Jimmy Carter's
defense budget by $4.1 billion. The Budget Committee's resolution failed, and
the House passed an amendment by Omar Burleson (D-Texas) to restore Carter's original defense estimate. A second attempt at passing the budget resolution succeeded after the Budget Committee redrafted the original budget resolution to include a larger defense budget.
In 1980, congressional leaders worked with President Carter to develop a
deficit reduction plan and use reconciliation procedures to enforce spending
cuts and tax increases. The budget resolution based on those meetings included $6.4 billion in spending cuts. O'Neill reluctantly accepted the budget
resolution, though he did not actively lobby for it, and the House passed the
budget resolution with bipartisan support. But after a conference with the Senate produced an increase in defense spending in exchange for more domestic
spending cuts, O'Neill publicly denounced the plan, stating, "The budget goes
against my philosophy." 14 The House rejected the conference budget by a vote
of 141 to 245.
After Budget Committee Chair Robert Giaimo (D-Conn.), Senate Budget
Committee Chair Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.), and President Carter worked
out a compromise that reduced defense spending by $800 million and added
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$1.3 billion for domestic programs, O'Neill became involved fully in the process. He instructed the Steering and Policy Committee to emphasize that the
vote on the compromise was a party issue; he met with deputy and at-large
whips to develop a strategy for building support for the budget resolution;
he sent a letter to all House Democrats stating that failure to vote for the
resolution would discredit the party; and he set up a task force to mobilize
support on the floor. 15 The House approved the conference report by a vote of
237 to 161.
One year later, the political climate changed dramatically and so did the
Speaker's ability to build a winning coalition in support of the Budget Committee's first budget resolution. In 1981, President Reagan rode the wave of a
convincing electoral victory that gave the Republicans control over the Senate
and a gain of thirty-four House seats. The president exploited the divisions
within the House Democratic party, and recruited southern Democrats to join
with House Republicans to pass four major budget bills: the fiscal 1982 first
budget resolution; an omnibus reconciliation bill including major cuts in domestic programs; a three-year tax plan providing tax breaks for individuals
and depreciation allowances for businesses; and additional spending reductions in an omnibus appropriations bill. 16 We will focus on the passage of the
first budget resolution, which illustrates the Speaker's strategy for dealing with
a fractionalized party and allows evaluation of his performance as a party leader in a divided government.
In the early stages of the budget process in 1981, O'Neill's strategy reflected
his middleman style of leadership and his institutional responsibility as
Speaker. The strategy was to accommodate as many members of the party as
possible so that the House Budget Committee could pass a Democratic budget
that offered a reasonable alternative to the president's budget. O'Neill placated
conservative Democrats who sought more representation on the Budget Committee and significant increases in defense spending. Meanwhile, O'Neill operated under the assumption that while the president was popular, his election
was based more on the public's dissatisfaction with Carter than on a mandate
for Reagan's conservative economic philosophy. O'Neill thought that the president deserved a fair opportunity to make a case for his program, but the
Speaker assumed that the public would reject Reagan's proposals to cut government programs. O'Neill took a low profile in the early stages of the budget
process. Rather than publicly attack the president, he contacted interest
groups, requested committees to study Reagan's budget proposals, encouraged
the media to expose the specific programs Reagan planned to cut, and pro-
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moted a floor amendment by Bill Hefner (D-N.C.) that would add $6.6 billion
to the Budget Committee's estimate for defense spending.17
Yet when the House voted for the first time ever to reject the House Budget
Committee's resolution and proceeded to approve the president's plan,
House Democrats criticized the Speaker's strategy. 18 Liberal Democrats
complained that Phil Gramm (D-Texas) should never have been appointed
to the Budget Committee. Gramm had deserted the party and worked with
David Stockman, director of the Office of Management and Budget, and Delbert Latta (Ohio), ranking Republican on the Budget Committee, to develop
an alternative to the Budget Committee's resolution. Other Democrats criticized O'Neill for taking a trip to Australia for two weeks while Reagan was
developing public support for his budget. Budget Committee Chair Jim Jones
(D-Okla.) was startled when on his return O'Neill announced that public
opinion in favor of the president was so strong that it was not worth fighting
against the president's plan. Finally, many Democrats wondered why the
Speaker did not appoint a task force to build support for the Budget Committee's resolution.
In retrospect, most of the charges were hurled in frustration and were exaggerated. Gramm was appointed to the Budget Committee on the promise that
ultimately he would support the party leadership. When Gramm broke his
promise and began working with Stockman he was barred from attending the
Democratic Budget Committee caucus meetings. O'Neill's trip to Australia
was planned two years before the budget was taken up by the House. Finally, a
task force seemed unnecessary in this case, because members had already made
up their minds prior to the vote. 19
It was probably a valid criticism of O'Neill to complain that he conceded
victory to Reagan before the budget even reached the floor. Part of the Speaker's role as the opposition party leader is to defend his or her party's position.
Even in the face of defeat, the Speaker would have better served the party by
publicly supporting the Budget Committee's plan. O'Neill himselflater admitted that he had underestimated the president's popularity and ability to generate support for his program. He said he "wasn't prepared for what happened
in 1981." 20 Still, one could argue reasonably that O'Neill's apparent blunders
only became significant within the broader context of Reagan's impressive
electoral victory, popular economic plan, and effective White House operation. R€agan's grassroots lobbying campaign was particularly successful in recruiting the votes of southern Democrats from districts in which Reagan ran
ahead of Carter in the 1980 election. 21
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For Speaker O'Neill, 1981 was a defining moment in terms of how he would
approach budget politics. He would no longer trust the president, and he perceived budget politics as a battle over fundamental principles. As Democratic
party unity improved in the 1980s, the challenge of passing budget resolutions
on the floor was replaced by efforts to define the party's priorities and protect
traditional Democratic programs from being cut in the midst oflarge deficits.
O'Neill continued to play the middleman role, but his main personal objective
was to block further domestic spending cuts, even if it meant stalling the process altogether. A top staff member of O'Neill's reflected on the Speaker's
commitment to maintain and, when possible, to restore the programs Reagan
sought to cut:
It is a tribute to O'Neill's management of the process, that under extraordinarily ad-

verse circumstances, when all the pressures were to cut and to get people to vote for
programs to help poor people was impossible, he managed to build them back up ....
He would literally hold up final agreement on a reconciliation bill over one AFDC
provision or one Medicaid provision. 22

Several•examples illustrate the point. In 1982, O'Neill used his scheduling
powers to oppose an omnibus reconciliation bill similar to the one passed by
the House in 1981. When House Republicans sought a rule to block floor
amendments to the reconciliation bill, O'Neill said, "We're not going to allow
ourselves to be put in that position again." 23 O'Neill announced, for example,
that the Post Office and Civil Service Committee was not bound to follow
instructions in the first budget resolution to make a 4 percent cap on cost-ofliving adjustments (COLA) to civil service pensions. When the committee ignored the instructions, O'Neill said the spending cut could be achieved if the
House voted for a separate amendment on the floor. The House approved a
rule that would allow the Republicans to restore the cut, but the Republicans
decided against the amendment, fearing the adverse political consequences of
proposing a reduction in a popular entitlement.
In 1983, as the government was on the verge of shutting down for lack of
appropriations by Congress, O'Neill held hostage a continuing resolution in
order to pass a $98.7 million package of social welfare benefits. O'Neill exalted:
"We showed them that we had a definite means of being able to stop the
further cutting of the safety net." 24
In 1984, O'Neill blocked a Senate Republican plan to impose caps on both
domestic and defense spending. O'Neill described the purpose of the Democratic strategy in reference to attempts to cut Democratic programs: "We want
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to stop the course of the [Reagan] administration. We're trying to stop them
from turning back the clock." 25 The conference deliberations remained deadlocked until the Congress was forced to pass an extension of the ceiling on total
federal debt. As part of the compromise to pass the debt ceiling, the conferees
agreed to drop the caps in the reconciliation bill.
In 1985, the House and Senate were deadlocked for two months over the
Senate's provision to freeze COLAs for social security at the prevailing rate of
inflation. O'Neill publicly announced, "I am bitterly opposed [to the cap on
the COLA for social security] and I will so notify and instruct my conferees." 26
Later, President Reagan asked if O'Neill would accept a cap on the COLAs in
exchange for a reduction in the defense budget; O'Neill recalls responding, "I
can't go along with this reduction on the COLAs. You can be assured that it's
never going to go through the House." 27 Ultimately, the president agreed with
O'Neill that the COLA should be retained, and the Speaker won another victory in blocking Republican efforts to cut social security benefits.
By placing partisan policy objectives over formal procedures, O'Neill
helped to perpetuate the delays and breakdowns that had become a standard
feature of budget process during the 1980s.

Jim Wright: Policy Commitments and Partisanship
If O'Neill's major challenge was to protect and defend traditional Democratic programs, his successor, Wright, sought to propose and advance budget
priorities. 28 As one Budget Committee staff person remarked, Wright was an
"unrelenting activist" in the budget process. 29 Wright's aggressive leadership
style served him well in formulating the fiscal 1988 first budget resolution. At
the beginning of his first year as Speaker (1987), Wright defined the challenge-to reduce the deficit and shift priorities from defense to domestic social
programs. Yet before the year ended, Speaker Wright experienced the limitations to activist, policy-oriented leadership in the House. And, while Wright
was very effective when the conditions called for decisive action, he was criticized for acting too hastily in situations that required patience.30
Wright ascended to the speakership in 1986 under conditions that appeared
to be favorable to "strong, policy-oriented leadership." 31 The Democrats had
just recaptured the Senate in the 1986 elections, House Democrats were demonstrating unprecedented levels of party cohesion on roll call votes, and President Reagan was damaged publicly by the Iran-Contra scandal and the lameduck status typically associated with a president's final two years in office. The
new Speaker took advantage of those conditions by leading the House Budget
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Committee to formulate a budget resolution that attempted to reduce the deficit and shift spending priorities from defense to domestic programs. Wright's
package included an $18 billion increase in tax revenues, an $18 billion cut in
defense spending, and $1.45 billion in new spending for domestic social
programs.
Never before had a Speaker used the budget process as an instrument for
defining his own agenda, let alone a budget that included tax increases. Many
House Democrats were skeptical about proposing a tax increase while President Reagan promised to veto any bills that increased taxes. But Wright believed that revenue increases were necessary in order to meet the deficit ceiling
of $108 billion for fiscal year 1988 under the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law.
At the same time, he wanted the party to endorse new spending for welfare
reform, health care for the elderly, homeless assistance, AIDS research, drug
prevention, and job training. Wright personally lobbied Budget Committee
Democrats and the Democratic Caucus to support his budget priorities.32 The
budget passed with a straight party-line vote in the Budget Committee and was
approved by the House by a vote of 230 to 192, with all the Republicans and
only nineteen Democrats voting against the resolution.
As the budget resolution moved on to further stages of the budget process,
Wright's objectives were to preserve the major provisions of the House-passed
budget resolution and to keep intact the coalition of Democrats who passed
the resolution. The Speaker was only partially successful. Wright's budget was
modified in conference deliberations with the Senate and was altered significantly by the reconciliation process and in negotiations with the president.
The first crack in Wright's coalition came during conference deliberations
with the Senate, though his priorities generally survived. The main controversy
was over defense spending. The Senate's budget resolution included about
$13 billion more for defense spending than the House, and liberal Democrats
in the House were decidedly against the Senate's defense figure. After several
weeks of negotiations, Speaker Wright and Senate leaders agreed to a budget
resolution that contained a contingency clause for the defense budget. The
budget would include the Senate's defense recommendation under the assumption that the president would sign a bill containing $19.3 billion in new
tax revenues. The House approved the conference plan, but by a much narrower margin than the original budget resolution. The vote was 215 to 201, as
thirty-four Democrats voted against the conference version of the resolution.
Wright's budget package began to unravel when the House took up the
reconciliation bill that would attempt to translate the recommendations of the
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budget resolution into law. The reconciliation bill consisted of $23 billion in
deficit reduction, with roughly half coming from spending cuts and half from
new taxes. The bill also contained a package of welfare benefits, the so-called
Downey package, that embodied Wright's priorities in the original budget
resolution. The package, including a measure that would require states to extend eligibility for the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program to two-parent families in which the primary wage earner was unemployed, would cost the federal government $148 million in fiscal year 1988 and
$1.7 billion over three years. Southern Democrats objected to the mix of taxes
and spending cuts in the reconciliation bill plus the AFDC mandate on the
states. Buddy MacKay (D-Fla.), described the problem for southern Democrats: "It's [the reconciliation bill] got two lightning rod issues [taxes and welfare]; both of which are career threatening in the South.... " 33 Wright suffered his first major defeat when the House defeated the rule on the
reconciliation bill by a vote of 203 to 217; forty-eight Democrats (thirty-two
from the South) voted against the bill.
The aftermath of this vote is described in Chapters 4 and 11. By forceful
action Speaker Wright was able to reverse his defeat and pass the budget.
However, the original package was compromised even further by a budget
summit agreement between the president and Congress. The summit produced a two-year budget plan, including a total of $76 billion in deficit
reduction, that set the guidelines for the final reconciliation bill and the omnibus appropriation bill for fiscal year 1988. As the curtain closed on Speaker
Wright's first year, he found himself relying on Republican votes to pass
both of those bills.34 And, though he succeeded in getting President Reagan
to sign a bill that raised $9 billion in taxes, it was half of what the
Speaker originally wanted.
.
Speaker Wright deserves credit for taking on the challenge of trying to raise
taxes to reduce the deficit and defining a Democratic agenda during the final
two years of the Reagan administration. Yet his aggressive style was not always
consistent with the expectations of House members. The results of Wright's
activist leadership reflect both the impressive potential of the Speaker's office
and the limitations to strong, policy-oriented leadership in the House.

Tom Foley: Balancing Institutional and Partisan Interests
Compared with Wright and O'Neill, Foley has been a much less partisan
Speaker. He has not yet attempted to push his own policy agenda, and he has
not engaged in the sort of partisan combat waged by his predecessors. Foley
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expressed reservations about the partisan element of the opposition party
leader role that he assumed during the Bush administration: "I was not elected
primarily to be the campaign manager of the next Democratic President. I
don't see my job that way." 35 House Democrats have occasionally criticized
Foley's nonpartisan style, which seems out of context in the highly partisan,
contentious atmosphere that has pervaded budget politics. Foley acknowledges and ignores his critics: "There are people who think I should be more
partisan, should be more aggressive, should be more combative. More hardedged .... I don't tend to agree with them." 36 Thus, Foley's speakership has
restored an interest in institutional leadership combined with a weaker commitment to partisan interests, and what appears to be almost no interest in
pursuing personal policy preferences.
Speaker Foley's major challenges in the budget process have been to help
pass the two largest deficit reduction plans in history. In both cases he has
acted as a consensus builder rather than an advocate for a particular set of
priorities. After Foley suffered an embarrassing defeat on the 1990 bipartisan
budget summit agreement, he helped to pass a Democratic-sponsored budget
and reconciliation bill later that year. In 1993, he served as an able lieutenant
of President Clinton's budget plan and reconciliation bill in the House. He
also played an instrumental role in lobbying House Democrats to support the
conference version of the reconciliation bill.
In January 1990, President George Bush submitted a budget that recommended $36 billion in deficit reduction to meet the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
deficit ceiling of $64 billion for fiscal year 1991. By April, however, as the
House Budget Committee deliberated over the first budget resolution, OMB
Director Richard Darman announced that the administration had underestimated the size of the deficit, and at least $50 billion more in spending cuts or
revenue increases would be needed to avoid sequestration. Despite Darman's
warning, Budget Committee Democrats decided to stick with Bush's original
budget assumptions and wait for the president to recommend a way to achieve
the additional $50 billion in deficit reduction. Speaker Foley expressed the
position of House Democrats, who were unwilling to let the administration off
the hook: "The first action has to be taken by the president. First, with the
president, then with us." 37
Recognizing that a sequestration order of at least $50 billion would force
deep cuts in defense spending, President Bush called a meeting with congressional leaders on May 6 to talk about a process for negotiating a deficit reduction deal with "no preconditions." Just three days later, however, Bush's Chief
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of Staff John Sununu stated that "no preconditions" meant the Democrats
could propose new taxes if they wanted. Sununu's statement confirmed the
suspicions of House Democrats who believed Bush's invitation to negotiate
with House leaders was a political ploy to get the Democrats to initiate a tax
increase as part of a deficit reduction package. While Foley was open to negotiations with the White House, many House Democrats distrusted Bush and
Darman and were opposed to bipartisan talks. The leadership decided to adopt
a "go slow" strategy in which Foley insisted that the president must publicly
acknowledge the need to increase taxes before the Democrats would go
along. 38 This strategy gave Bush an opening to accept a tax increase without
alienating House Democrats.
On June 26, after weeks of ambiguity about the president's intentions to
revoke his campaign pledge of no new taxes and propose a tax increase,
Speaker Foley told Bush: "If you issue this statement [on the need for taxes]
we'll agree with it." 39 Following the meeting, Bush made a televised address
stating the need to increase revenues as part of a deficit reduction plan, and
Foley backed the president at a press conference following the speech. The
Speaker said the Democrats were not interested in scoring political points for
persuading the president to abandon his "read my lips, no new taxes" campaign pledge. Foley stated, "I think it's important that neither political party
attempt to make political capital out of serious bipartisan efforts to reach a
budget agreement." 40
From that point, the budget moved sluggishly through a series of summit
meetings involving congressional leaders and White House officials. After failing to reach agreement in August, a group of twenty-three lawmakers took
refuge for ten days of private talks at Andrews Air Force base in early September. But a dispute over the president's proposal for a capital gains tax cut
undermined chances for a final agreement. As the beginning of the fiscal year
approached (October 1), and the threat of an $85 billion sequester became
more likely, bipartisan talks continued in Speaker Foley's office, this time with
a much smaller group of eight people. On September 30, the group reached a
budget agreement that would be debated and voted on by the House. It was a
five-year, $500 billion deficit reduction package that reduced discretionary
spending by $182.4 billion, cut Medicare by $60 billion, and raised $163 billion
from a host of excise taxes, including gasoline, tobacco, alcohol, and luxury
items.
But the leaders of the summit recognized that the compromise agreement
faced an uphill battle from the day it was announced. President Bush admitted,
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"Sometimes you don't get it the way you want, and this is such a time for me."
Speaker Foley noted, "This isn't the kind of thing the political system wants to
go racing out in the streets [about] and saying, 'Joy! Joy!'" 41 It did not take
long for members to attack the budget and the process used to formulate it.
Members of both parties condemned the closed, secretive talks of the summit
that prohibited them from having any input. Conservative House Republicans, led by Minority Whip Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) argued that the plan included too many taxes and would stifle economic growth. Liberal Democrats
complained that the excise taxes were regressive and that reductions in the
earned income tax credit, delays in unemployment benefits, and increases in
Medicare deductibles and premiums were unfair.
Nevertheless, the leaders of both parties attempted to garner a majority of
members from their respective caucuses. On the Democratic side, early whip
counts showed very little enthusiasm for the budget. Speaker Foley tried to
persuade committee chairs to vote in favor of the budget resolution on the
premise that they could change specific aspects of the plan in the reconciliation
process. He made the same appeal to the Democratic Caucus on the morning
of the vote. Finally, in a dramatic end to a long day of debate on the floor,
Foley spoke to the House. He described the problem of large deficits; he urged
members to look beyond partisan politics; and he reminded them again that
passing the budget resolution was only the beginning of the process. Foley
stated: "The president said today to me, and I repeated to the press, that it was
our conviction ... that many of the policies established in the budget agreement were for illustrative purposes only, and that the legislative committees
had the right as well as the obligation to consider alternative policies to achieve
similar savings." 42
Despite the Speaker's efforts, the House rejected the budget resolution by a
vote of 179 to 254. Foley's strategy of trying to mobilize the committee chairs
was unsuccessful. Only fourteen of the twenty-seven Democratic C')mmittee
chairs and only seven of the thirteen subcommittee chairs of the Appropriations Committee voted for the budget. His plea to pass the budget resolution
so that the House committees could work out the details of the deficit reduction plan alarmed House Republicans, who believed the reconciliation bill
would be even less appealing to them than the budget resolution. Once it was
clear that a majority of Republicans would vote against the plan, previously
undecided Democrats also had reason to vote against it.
Some Democrats saw the vote on the budget resolution as a referendum on
Foley's leadership. Foley's critics charged that he was too willing to compro-
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mise the party's principles in order to close a deal with the president. Liberal
Democrats, in particular, were surprised that the Speaker expected them to
vote for a bill that contained severe cuts in social programs and regressive
taxes. The fact that they were not consulted in the process added insult to
injury.
Yet Foley believed the vote was as much a failure of bipartisan cooperation
in an era of intense partisan politics as a failure of his leadership strategy. The
Speaker knew it would be difficult to sell the package to House Democrats and
he personally did not like all aspects of the summit package. But he also knew
that a strictly Democratic alternative would not have passed in the Senate. The
Speaker thought if the Republicans could produce a majority on their side,
then a majority of House Democrats would also go along, if only because they
feared that voters would be even more angry if they had done nothing. 43
In the last analysis, although Foley lost the battle over the summit budget,
he helped to win the war for the Democrats. House Democrats were able to
regroup and pass their own budget resolution just three days after the summit
agreement failed. The new plan stripped many of the controversial provisions
in the summit bill and turned over the legislative details to the committees.
Throughout the next month, as Democrats from both chambers worked
through conference negotiations, Foley played an essentially mediating role
between House and Senate Democrats. Eventually the Congress and the president agreed to a budget that included a 3 percent increase in the highest marginal rate of taxation; excise taxes on alcohol, fuel, and tobacco; caps on discretionary spending; and much less severe cuts in Medicare than the summit
budget had called for. During the process, Democrats painted Republicans as
the party of the rich, unwilling to raise the top rate for individual income
earners, a theme that Clinton would repeat in the 1992 presidential campaign.
Meanwhile, Bush was unable to rebound from his decision to violate his
promise not to raise taxes. Ironically, Speaker Foley, who said the Democrats
would not turn the president's decision to raise taxes into a political game,
played an important role in persuading the president to revoke his promise,
and once Bush endorsed a tax increase, the game was on.
When Clinton was elected president, Speaker Foley's role changed from
representing Democrats in negotiations with the administration to delivering
votes for the president. In 1993, the Speaker participated in a coordinated
lobbying effort with the White House to attract wary Democrats to vote for a
$496 billion reconciliation package of taxes and spending cuts. Up until the
day before the vote, the leadership appeared to be short of the necessary ma-
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jority to pass the bill. Conservative Democrats wanted more spending cuts and
fewer tax increases, and they sought a cap on entitlement spending. House
Democrats were also worried that the proposed energy tax would be changed
in the Senate, which was scheduled to meet after the floor vote in the House.
After House leaders agreed to a provision to control entitlements and a
promise by the president to reduce the energy tax and cut more entitlement
spending, the House passed the bill by a vote of 219 to 213. As part of an
intense lobbying effort by the White House, the Speaker helped to cool tensions within the party and persuaded members to support the bill, but the key
decisions regarding the content of the final package ultimately were made by
the president.
The Speaker performed a similar role when the House considered the
conference version of the reconciliation bill. Securing approval of the
conference bill was difficult because of the slim margin of victory on final
passage of the House bill, the unanimous opposition of Republicans, and differences between the House and Senate bills. The conference provided recalcitrant members with an opportunity to shape the final details of the budget
package before it was sent to the president, and they made the most of this
opportunity. 44
For members who disagreed with the conference bill, the Speaker explained
that there was no viable alternative and that the consequences of defeat-a
failed Democratic presidency and a shock to financial markets-were too
onerous to bear. Yet neither the conference bill nor the arguments made by
party leaders were enough to ensure victory. As the floor votes on the conference bill neared, passage of the bill remained in doubt. In an effort to persuade
wary Democrats to vote for the bill, President Clinton signed two executive
orders that ostensibly made a firmer commitment to deficit reduction (a deficit reduction trust fund and an entitlement review in the event that spending
exceeded the targets in the plan) and engaged in a final round oflast minute
deal-making that included a promise to send Congress more spending cuts in
a few months. Meanwhile, party leaders engaged in extensive lobbying efforts
to pass the bill and promised members the opportunity to amend the president's next budget package, including amendments that would cut entitlements and discretionary spending and call for a constitutional amendment to
balance the budget. 45 The bill ultimately passed by a slim two-vote margin,
218 to 216.
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Looking to the Future:
The Speaker and the Budget Process
The Speaker's strategies for dealing with future challenges will depend on
prevailing conditions and the individual Speaker. The 1994 midterm elections
produced the first Republican majority in forty years, a new Speaker of the
House, Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.), and a return to divided party government. The
Republicans are expected to be unified and eager to govern. In the near term, if
previous patterns of divided government hold, we can expect Speaker Gingrich to play a leading role as the spokesperson of the House majority party. At
the very least, the Republicans will propose a constitutional amendment to
balance the budget, a key ingredient of the party's "Contract with America."
Gingrich and the Republicans should also challenge the basic priorities of
Clinton's budgets: the Republicans are especially likely to clash with Clinton
over tax policy and the level of defense spending. Gingrich and the supply side
wing of the House Republican Party will also need to deal with fiscal conservatives on the Senate side. Majority Leader Bob Dole and Senate Budget Committee Chair Pete Domenici appear to be more concerned with the budget
deficit then offering a tax break.
As a party leader, one of Gingrich's primary challenges will be to handle
criticism from Democrats about how Republican spending and tax priorities
square with a promise to balance the budget. Gingrich will also need to determine how actively to engage in the budget committee's deliberations over the
budget resolution. And he will need to decide if and when to engage in budget
negotiations with the White House, and how to represent Republicans in those
negotiations. Yet his biggest challenge might be adapting to the role of institutional leader. Gingrich has displayed a tendency to be abrasive and confrontational, a style more conductive to a minority party leader than a Speaker. As
the Speaker, Gingrich has a responsibility to the House, as well as to the Republican party. Like all speakers, Gingrich will struggle to balance party goals
with procedural fairness. The manner in which Gingrich attempts to balance
these competing interests will define his role in the budget process. The challenge for Gingrich might be particularly important as a restive public judges
the performance of the new House majority party.
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